tree: 074cb39e321efec25995c5bc60fcc2408d43fe8f [path history] [tgz]
  1. README.md
  2. example/
doc/json-signing/README.md

JSON Signing

JSON claim objects need to be signed. If I want to distribute a Perkeep blob object publicly, declaring that I “favorite” or “star” a named entity, it should be verifiable.

Background

The properties we want in the JSON file, ideally, include:

GOAL #1) it's still a valid JSON file in its entirety

This means no non-JSON compliant header or footer.

This implies that the data structure to be signed and the signature metadata be separate, in an outer JSON wrapper.

This has been discussed and implemented in various ways. For example, in jchris's canonical-json project, http://github.com/jchris/canonical-json, the “signed-content” and the “signature” are parallel objects under the same outer JSON object.

The problem then becomes that the verifier, after parsing the JSON blob, needs to re-serialize the JSON “signed-content” object, byte-for-byte as in the original, in order to verify the signature.

In jchris' strategy, the canonicalization is implemented by referencing JavaScript code that serializes it. This has the advantage that the serialization could change over time, but the disadvantage that you have to embed a Rhino, V8, SpiderMonkey, or similar into your parser, which is somewhat heavy. Considering that canonical JSON serialization is something that should be relatively static and could be defined once, I'm not sure that the flexibility is worth the cost.

Overall, though, the jchris approach's structure of the JSON file is good.

Notably, it satisfies on of my other goals:

GOAL #2) The document still be human-readable

For instance, the laptop.org project is proposing this Canonical JSON format: http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Canonical_JSON. Unfortunately, all whitespace is stripped. It's not a deal breaker, but lacks human readableness.

You might say, “Bring your own serialization! Wrap the signed-content in a string!”

But then you‘re back to the readable problem, because JSON strings can’t have embedded newline literals.

Further, the laptop.org proposal requires the use of a new JSON serialization library and parser for each language which wants to produce Perkeep documents. This isn‘t a huge deal, but considering that JSON libraries already exist and people are oddly passionate about their favorites and inertia’s not to be ignored, I state the next goal:

GOAL #3) Don't require a new JSON library for parsing/serialization

With the above goals in mind, Perkeep uses the following scheme to sign and verify JSON documents:

SIGNING

  • Start with a JSON object (not an array) to be encoded and signed. We'll call this data structure ‘O’. While this signing technique could be used for applications other than Perkeep, this document is specifically about Perkeep, which requires that the JSON object ‘O’ contain the following two key/value pairs:

     "camliVersion": "1"
     "camliSigner": "hashalg-xxxxxxxxxxx"  (blobref of ASCII-armored public key)
    
  • To find your camliSigner value, you could use GPG like:

     $ gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring=example/test-keyring.gpg --secret-keyring=example/test-secring.gpg \
           --export --armor 26F5ABDA > example/public-key.txt
    
     $ sha1sum example/public-key.txt
     8616ebc5143efe038528c2ab8fa6582353805a7a
    

    ... so the blobref value for camliSigner is “sha1-8616ebc5143efe038528c2ab8fa6582353805a7a”. Clients will use this value in the future to find the public key to verify signtures.

  • Serialize in-memory JSON object ‘O’ with whatever JSON serialization library you have available. internal or trailing whitespace doesn‘t matter. We’ll call the JSON serialization of ‘O’ (defined in earlier step) ‘J’. (e.g. signing-before-J.camli)

  • Now remove any trailing whitespace and exactly and only one ‘}’ character from the end of string ‘J’. We'll call this truncated, trimmed string ‘T’. (e.g. signing-before.camli)

  • Create an ASCII-armored detached signature of this document, e.g.:

     gpg --detach-sign --local-user=54F8A914 --armor \
         -o signing-before.camli.detachsig signing-before.camli
    

    (The output file is in signing-before.camli.detachsig)

  • Take just the base64 part of that ASCII detached signature into a single line, and call that ‘S’.

  • Append the following to ‘T’ above:

     ,"camliSig":"<S>"}\n
    

    ... where <S> is the single-line ASCII base64 detached signature. Note that there are exactly 13 bytes before <S> and exactly 3 bytes after <S>. Those must match exactly.

  • The resulting string is ‘C’, the camli-signed JSON document.

    (The output file is in signing-after.camli)

In review:

O == the object to be signed
J == any valid JSON serialization of O
T == J, with 0+ trailing whitespace removed, and then 1 '}' character
     removed
S == ascii-armored detached signature of T
C == CONCAT(T, ',"camliSig":"', S, '"}', '\n')

(strictly, the trailing newline and the exact JSON serialziation of the camlisig element doesn‘t matter, but it’d be advised to follow this recommendation for compatibility with other verification code)

VERIFYING

  • start with a byte array representing the JSON to be verified. call this ‘BA’ (“bytes all”)

  • given the byte array, find the last index in ‘BA’ of the 13 byte substring:

     ,"camliSig":"
    

    Let's call the bytes before that ‘BP’ (“bytes payload”) and the bytes starting at that substring ‘BS’ (“bytes signature”)

  • define ‘BPJ’ (“bytes payload JSON”) as ‘BP’ + the single byte ‘}’.

  • parse ‘BPJ’, verifying that it‘s valid JSON object (dictionary). verify that the object has a ‘camliSigner’ key with a string key that’s a valid blobref (e.g. “sha1-xxxxxxx”) note the camliSigner.

  • replace the first byte of ‘BS’ (the ‘,’) with an open brace (‘{’) and parse it as JSON. verify that it's a valid JSON object with exactly one key: “camliSig”

  • using ‘camliSigner’, a Perkeep blobref, find the blob (cached, via camli/web lookup, etc) that represents a GPG public key.

  • use GnuPG or equivalent libraries to verify that the ASCII-armored GPG signature in “camliSig” signs the bytes in ‘BP’ using the GPG public key found via the ‘camliSigner’ blobref

Libraries